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Abstract
We address the presence of supplier-induced demand in the Belgian primary care
market, which is characterized by a ￿xed fee system and a high density of General
Practitioners (GP). Using a unique dataset on the number of visits of all Belgian GPs,
we ￿rst investigate whether we can ￿nd evidence of demand inducement by Belgian
GPs. Novel to this literature is that we furthermore investigate which type of visits
GPs typically use for inducing demand.
We extend the theoretical framework of Carlsen and Grytten (1998) to allow for a
limitation in the possibility of inducing demand due to the amount of information in
the market. As a result, our model predicts GPs to induce demand when the level of
competition becomes high, while a further increase of competition triggers a decrease
in their inducing behavior.
The results indicate the presence of both availability e⁄ects and supplier inducement
in the Belgian primary care market. We also ￿nd that GPs prefer the use of home visits
during working hours to induce demand for their services. However, when competition
gets ￿erce, they substitute toward inducement through o¢ ce visits.
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In an era of ever-increasing budgets for health care, studying the functioning of health care
markets becomes very important1. The key to controlling the budget namely lies in providing
the correct set of incentives to all parties involved. Only when one fully understands how
e.g. consumers and suppliers make their decisions in this market, one can hope to construct
a tool to restrain the increase in public health expenditure.
Mostly one looks at demand and supply ine¢ ciencies in the health insurance system for
explaining the high consumption levels. However, also the role of the General Practitioner
(referred to as GP further on) is important in constructing policies to reduce the overall
consumption of medical care. As patients delegate authority to health providers, they control
the health consumption of their patients to a considerable extent2. It is thus crucial to
understand the behavior of the GP and her reaction to changes in her direct environment3.
One of the most debated issues concerning their behavior is the question whether or not GPs
are inducing demand for primary health care.
It should not be surprising that the study of supplier-induced demand (SID) is well docu-
mented in health economics since it has far-reaching implications4. If it is true that suppliers,
and more speci￿cally health providers, induce demand for their services, the standard eco-
nomic theory no longer applies. That is, the traditional relationship between demand and
supply does not exist for the medical care markets. Whether or not SID is present in the
health care markets of a country, will thus in￿ uence to a large extent the optimality of dif-
ferent public health policies. For example, if GPs engage in inducing demand, restrictions
on the number of GPs can be a good idea, whereas drops in fees would not have a signi￿cant
impact on the budget. However, although SID is well documented, there is no unanimous
approach for testing its presence.
The market under investigation in this paper is the Belgian primary care market. Ac-
cording to the literature, the Belgium health care system provides the perfect setting for
demand inducement by GPs. It is characterized by third-party payment, GPs are paid ac-
cording to a ￿xed fee schedule and the number of GPs per capita is high. Furthermore, a
￿rst look at data on consumption levels of care in Belgium, indicates a positive link between
1According to the ￿gures from the country notes of OECD Health Data 2006, on average, OECD-countries
spend 8:9% of their GDP on health care (2003). The public health expenditure even amounted to 10:1% of
GDP for Belgium in 2003.
2Patients delegate authority because of information asymmetry, shifting responsibility and insurance
coverage (see Zweifel & Manning, 2000).
3For convenience, the GP will be referred to as ￿ she￿and the patient as ￿ he￿ .
4For an overview of the literature, see e.g. Labelle et al (1994)
1consumption per capita and the number of GPs per capita (see Figure 1). Finally, there
is some prior indication of SID. Schokkaert & Van de Voorde (2005) study the change in
public health expenditure after the increase in co-payment in 1994 and the linear drop in
fees for health providers in 1997. They document that the public health expenditure only
experienced a small drop. More speci￿cally, the immediate price e⁄ect was compensated
by quantity increases in the following years (see also Van de Voorde et al., 2001 and Cockx
& Brasseur, 20015). There are thus reasons to believe that inducement is a feature of the
Belgian health care system.
Figure I: Consumption per capita according to GP density
(nobs = 983 zip codes)*
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
GP density (=10,000* N/mpop)
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
* We excluded the 10 zip codes with the highest GP density (more than 31 GPs per inhabitants), to
show that the trend is not driven by the outliers. Including these local markets amplifies the effect.
In this paper, we perform a direct test for inducing behavior by Belgian GPs. We collected
a unique data set on the individual performance of all registered GPs in Belgium and ask
whether a GP arti￿cially increases the demand for her services when the level of competition
for patients increases. For this aim, the theoretical framework of Carlsen & Grytten (1998) is
used, where availability e⁄ects can be identi￿ed seperately from inducement e⁄ects. However,
we provide an extension to the model because of the high levels of GP density in Belgium.
That is, we introduce a limitation to the opportunity to induce demand into the theoretical
model. This captures the possibility that, when the amount of information on GPs is high in
the local market, the knowledge of the patients can prevent the GP to induce demand. As a
result, the model predicts that GP induce demand when competition becomes considerably
5In both papers, the price elasticity of demand is estimated based on detailed data of Belgian consumers
and their consumption of medical care. They use the increase of the out-of-pocket price of primary health
care in 1994. The price elasticity of demand provides indirect evidence of SID since, in the presence of SID,
the reaction of the demand to price changes is diluted by the reaction of the supply side. Van de Voorde et
al (2001) initially ￿nd that, at least in the short run, not all reduction in demand due to the price increase
is countered by demand inducement by the GPs. There however has been some critique on the estimates by
Cockx & Brasseur (2003) which correct the estimates downwardly, leading to stronger indication of supplier
induced demand.
2high, but that she will reduce her inducing behavior when the GP density becomes very high.
In terms of the empirical implementation, we therefore allow for a rich pattern of e⁄ects of
supply on per capita consumption according to the level of competition. Also novel to the
literature is that, next to investigating the presence of inducement, we additionally look at
the way GPs induce demand. That is, we look at which type of visits a GP employs for
inducing demand6.
Contrary to the ￿ndings of Carlsen & Grytten (1998) and subsequent work on Norway, the
results of our cross-sectional study provide evidence of supplier-induced demand by Belgian
GPs. There clearly is a positive e⁄ect of GP density on per capita consumption of GP
services. We ￿nd that this relationship can only partly be explained by availability e⁄ects
and thus conclude in favor of the presence of inducing behavior of Belgian GPs. Furthermore,
the analysis on the di⁄erent types of visits indicates that GPs seem to prefer the use of home
visits during working hours to induce demand. However, when competition gets ￿erce, they
substitute towards inducement through o¢ ce visits because of the risk of loosing patients
associated with continuing inducement of home visits (information e⁄ect).
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by discussing the Belgian pri-
mary care market and make the link with issues of supplier-induced demand. In this section,
we also introduce our data set on Belgian GPs, as this determines the approach taken to
investigate the presence of SID. Section 3 then discusses the methodology to identify induce-
ment from our data set. We develop a theoretical framework and introduce the empirical
implementation. We furthermore give some insights in the type of visit a GP uses for induc-
ing demand. Section 4 discusses the results of the estimation for the Belgian primary care
market and Section 5 concludes.
2 Primary care and GP induced demand in Belgium
The origin of supplier inducement can be traced to two features of health care markets.
First, there is an extensive information asymmetry between a GP and a patient. Second,
the GP has a dual role as both the advisor of the patient as well as the provider of the
services. These features enable the GP to guide the decision process of the patient is such
a way that she maximizes her own utility/pro￿t function, without the patient knowing it.
The GP can thus recommend services that do not pass the objective patient cost-bene￿t
6To our knowlegde, the only related question that has been adressed is the distinction between inducing
the number of visits or inducing the content of a treatment. We instead focus only on the number of visits,
but split this up in di⁄erent type of visits: o¢ ce visits and home visits during working hours.
3thresholds (Dranove 1988). Especially if her income/utility is threatened, she will have an
incentive to e.g. induce more visits with her patients to maintain her income/utility level. As
a result, the inducement hypothesis predicts that, when an additional GP enters the market,
there will be a higher consumption level in that market, which is driven by the behavior of
the GP7. As this would have important implications for policy, it is necessary to investigate
whether this behavior is present in the Belgian primary care market.
The hypothesis of supplier inducement remains however hard to test since a sound analy-
sis should capture all the peculiarities of the health care markets. As Grytten et al. (1995)
put it:
A sound analysis requires a model that deals with the provision of suboptimal,
optimal and supraoptimal levels of health care; it should account for a world
of ill-informed and perhaps misinformed consumers; the model should take into
account that physicians are both concerned with the patient￿ s well-being and their
own well-being; and ￿nally, institutional factors should be taken into account.
Often, health services are provided in markets which are subject to complex
government subsidies and regulations.
There is however an extensive literature that models the decision problem of the GP
related to supplier inducement. Although one can not account for all the speci￿cs of the
problem, empirical research can provide indication of the presence of supplier inducement.
The type of information that one can use however determines to a large extent which type of
conclusions on inducement can be drawn. Traditionally town-level data was used, as in e.g.
Fuchs (1978), but these aggregated approaches were highly criticized due to identi￿cation
issues (e.g. Auster & Oaxaca, 1981). As in the recent years data availability has improved
considerably, a lot of micro-models to re￿ne the testing are developed. However, not only
is there no consensus on the methodology to correctly identify inducing behavior, also the
results are far from conclusive.
Before presenting a model to identify supplier inducement, we start by exploring the
organization of the primary care market in Belgium and relate this to the possibility of
inducing behavior of the GPs. Since the availability of data determines the way to and
7Note however that GP inducement is not necessarily a bad thing and we are not willing to make a
judgement. Although SID has a negative connotation, it can, at least in the health care markets, also increase
social welfare. More care is generally thought of as a good thing, especially when considering the negative
externalities of an illness. Furthermore, it might well be that the individual consumer underestimates his
demand for care (￿ illness behavior￿(Mechanic, 1968)). On the other hand, of course, supplier inducement
results in a possible overconsumption of the medical care, generated by the economic self-interest of the
physicians. We investigate the presence of the inducement because of the consequences for public policy.
4the extent to which we can test for supplier-induced demand, this section continues by
introducing the data set on the Belgian GPs.
2.1 Organization of the Belgian primary care market
Belgium is known for an excellent availability of health care. For the primary care market,
there is on average one active GP per 803 inhabitants (2001)8. Note only are there many
GPs, consumers can also choose freely among them. Moreover, there is no gatekeeping role
for the GP, which implies direct access to all care, including to specialists. With a total
care density of about 71 general or specialized practitioners per 10;000 inhabitants (Cesifo,
2001), there is a very good health care coverage in Belgium.
GPs typically operate from an o¢ ce in which they receive their patients and perform
home visits at the patients homes. With an average of 37% of all visits being home visits
(2001), Belgium is at the top of the ranking. Moreover, GPs are joined in a system of night
and weekend duty to guarantee permanent access to primary care.
The GP is reimbursed for her activities through a fee-for-service system9. The fee sched-
ules are established periodically, as an agreement between all parties involved (sickness funds,
government and GP representation). Although GPs can opt out of the negotiated fees by for-
mally rejecting them, ￿gures of RIZIV/INAMI indicate that 85% of all GPs comply with the
￿xed fees. Moreover, GPs who commit themselves to continue training and to be involved
in the local organization of the primary health care, get an o¢ cial ￿ accreditation￿ , which
entitles them to charge a higher (￿xed) fee10. The higher fee however does not translate in a
higher consumer price. An important di⁄erence with other countries is that GPs do not get
any extra reimbursement for the number of laboratory tests they request. This implies that
the GP has no bene￿ts of inducing more tests and therefore will not be inclined to do so.
Finally, Belgian primary care is characterized by a third-payer system, in which the
patient only pays part of the total cost of care. Although the consumer￿ s co-payment is
relatively high in Belgium, the frequency of GP visits is much higher compared to other
European countries; the Belgian Health Survey of 2001 indicates that, on average, Belgians
8Note that the physician density is much higher. With physicians de￿ned as all practising doctors that
are not specialists (=GPs + others), there were only 257 inhabitants per practising physician in 2001. Or
put di⁄erently, there were 39 physicians per 10;000 inhabitants, which makes Belgium the third physician
dense country in Europe, after Greece and Italy (OECD Health Data and RIZIV/INAMI). Also compared
to the rest of the world, these ￿gures are very high: for example, in the US, there are about 27 physicians
per 10;000 inhabitants.
9That is, per contact with a patient, the GP is reimbursed with a ￿xed fee.
10This can be interpreted as a signal of quality toward the consumers, although not all GPs (a minority)
are in a position to get the accreditation.
5have yearly 6:5 visits with a GP11.
Given these features, the primary care market in Belgium provides an excellent setting
for GP inducement. First, the high GP density implies a limited pool of patients for each GP.
The pressure on the average GP￿ s income is thus considerably high, which adds to persuading
her to induce additional demand for her services. Second, due to the fee-for-service system,
the income of the GP is positively related to her activity. Any reduction in the consumers￿
utilization thus automatically leads to a proportional decrease in the GP￿ s income, as she
has very few options to increase the revenue per item of service (the only means for GPs
to induce demand is through increasing the number of visits). Third, since patients only
pays a part of the costs, their marginal costs of a higher utilization are rather low, relative
to the bene￿ts for the GP. In other words, consumers are less sensitive to using another
consultation.
On the other hand, the high GP density in Belgium, together with the absence of a
gatekeeping role for the GP, makes it harder for the GP to control the demand. In case of a
high GP density, there are very low travel and search costs for the consumers which results
in a high concentration and accessibility of information in the market. This empowers the
consumer. If the patient suspects that the GP is not operating entirely in his interests (which
the patient will also be able to do better), the threshold for switching between GPs or to go
see a specialist is very low. Therefore, high levels of GP density can in principle limit the
possibility of inducing behavior.
Finally, the presence of a ￿xed fee schedule facilitates the interpretation of the increase
in the level of consumption due to an increase in the number of GPs in two ways. First,
the relation between prices and quantities does not interfere with the analysis, so that the
distinction with the neoclassic model is clear12. Second, since the prices are ￿xed at a
national level, they are independent of the number of GPs operating in a local market and
thus do not in￿ uence the supply of care in that market. Furthermore, due to the high GP
density, it is unlikely to have demand excesses13.
11Note that this is the average number of contact with a GP only. The same survey (GezondheidsenquŒte
2001, Belgiº) indicates that the average number of contacts with specialists is a bit more than 3 per year.
12Remember that the neoclassic model also predicts that a supply increase results in an increase in the
total consumption of the good/service. However, this mechanism is driven by a simultaneous drop in prices.
13Remark that the basic characteristics of the Belgian primary health care market is similar to the Nor-
wegian one, studied extensively by Grytten et al (1995), Carlsen and Grytten (1998), Słrensen and Grytten
(1999) and Grytten and Słrensen (2001). However, Belgium only has contract physicians and no salaried
physicians (that work independently of a hospital).
62.2 Data set
RIZIV/INAMI, the National Institute for Sickness and Disability Insurance of Belgium, owns
a rich database on the behavior of the individual physicians and patients. For this paper,
we are interested in the behavior of GPs as they are mainly responsible for the primary
care. The identi￿cation of the genuine GPs from the dataset with all physicians, is based
on GP performance measures that are in accordance with a new regulation that is e⁄ective
since July 1st, 200614. This stipulates that a GP will only remain certi￿ed if she has at
least 500 visits in one of the last ￿ve years. We furthermore restrict a GP to have at least
50 patients in one of the last ￿ve years15. We want to stress that this is not an exclusion
of the small GPs, but rather a selection of the GPs that are available to the public, active
and somewhat viable. Note also that we do not exclude entrants and exiters out of the
dataset16. We identify 12;133 GPs in 2001, for which we observe yearly GP level data.
Due to privacy reasons, the records are however ￿ anonymized￿which leaves us with little
GP-speci￿c information.
We categorize our data into four groups of variables; we have an indicator of the supply
of primary care, indicators of the level of consumption of primary care and some GP-speci￿c
control variables from RIZIV/INAMI. This dataset is enriched with additional market spe-
ci￿c controls for 200117. We now discuss these variables in more detail and refer to Table
1 for the descriptive statistics. Furthermore, Table 2 provides some additional insights by
assigning markets to one of ￿ve groups according to their GP density: group 1 contains the
20% markets with the lowest GP density, whereas group 5 collects the 20% markets with the
highest GP density (GP dense areas).
Supply indicator
As a measure of local supply of primary health care, we work with GP density (denoted
by R), de￿ned as the ratio of the number of active GPs in the local market (N) to the number
of inhabitants (x10;000). This measure takes into account the magnitude of the market and
14The RIZIV/INAMI dataset also includes e.g. physicians connected to companies/government or those
who only do guard duty. Our selection criterium is based on "Ministerieel besluit tot vaststelling van de
criteria voor de erkenning van huisartsen (21/02/2006)".
15The latter is done to exclude the GPs who only do guard duty, and thus are as such not to be considered
as real rivals of the regular GPs. Note that for physicians with at least 500 contacts, the restriction to at
least 50 patients is not at all strong. Note that we use data from 2000 until 2004 to select the GPs.
16While their output decisions will be taken into account in evaluating a response on an increase or decrease
in GP density (which is caused by these entrants and exiters), we want to draw conclusions on per capita
consumption levels and therefore the inclusion of them is needed. The overall conclusions of the analysis for
the balanced dataset do however not change - on the contrary, we get more pronounced and stronger e⁄ects.
17The market speci￿c characteristics are provided by the NIS (National Institute of Statistics), Ecodata
(Federal Government Agency for Economics) and RSZ (the National Institute of Social Security).
7in such gives a correct measure of the degree of competition in the direct environment of the
GP. Since the majority of the population has a ￿xed GP and since patients in general do
not travel far for primary care, the GP density is de￿ned on the level of Belgian zip codes,
which can be thought of as the relevant local market of a GP18. We identify all Belgian zip
codes in which at least one GP is active, which implies that we work with information on
993 out of the 1;144 zip codes. Looking at Table 1, the average GP density in 2001 is 12:46,
which implies that on average there was one GP per 803 inhabitants. Note however that
there is a large variance: the ￿rst group of markets, with the lowest GP density, have an
average of 7:12 GPs per 10;000 inhabitants, whereas the group 5 markets are characterized
by an average GP density of 20:25.
Appendix 1 gives an insight in the spread of the GP density across Belgium zip codes for
2001. It is immediately clear that it will be important to correct for the Belgian Communities;
nearly all of the Flemish local markets have a GP density below average. In Wallonia, we ￿nd
a mixture of markets with high and low GP density, whereas Brussels is mainly characterized
by GP densities above average.
Performance/Consumption indicators
Our data includes the yearly number of patients and the yearly number of visits of
di⁄erent types for every GP in 200119. In the subsequent analysis we focus on the yearly
number of visits per GP, which is denoted by Q. We ￿nd that the average Belgian GP had
a total of 3;909 contacts in 2001, which implies an average of 6:80 contacts with each of her
patients20. The RIZIV/INAMI dataset also provides a split up of the total number of visits
according to the type of visit. We concentrate on the number of o¢ ce visits (Q_O¢ ce) and
the number of home visits during working hours (Q_Home). As indicated before, there is a
high consumption of home visits, with an average of 1;539 home visits per year per GP. The
average GP ￿nally performed 2;281 o¢ ce visits in 2001. There however is a large variation
in the performance of GPs.
Note that there are signi￿cantly more GPs operating in the markets that are part of
group 3 and group 4 (average or higher than average GP density). As their GP density
18Since GPs are anonymized in the dataset, we only have limited information on their location (only zip
code). This prevents us to work on a lower level of aggregation.
19A patient is uniquely assigned to the GP which he visited most during that year. About 94% of the
Belgian population indicates having a ￿xed GP (2001). Patients do come in contact with other GPs in case
primary care is needed outside working hours (during guard duty).
20To give some idea of the magnitude of this ￿gure, taking that a full time GP works 6 days out of 7 and
takes 2 holidays of 2 weeks a year, this implies that the average GP has 13 contacts per day. Note that the
performance ￿gures are considerably higher in case we focus attention to those GPs that are neither just
entering or have decided to exit the market. For 2001, the yearly average number of visits per GP would
then be 4;300, of which 2;503 were o¢ ce visits and 1;702 were home visits during working hours.
8is moderate, this implies that the markets of group 3 and 4 also on average have a larger
population size. It is thus not group 5, which collects the markets with the highest GP
density, that contains the big cities. Furthermore, the average GP has the highest workload
when she is located in a market of group 1 (when the level of competition is low) and this
carries over to the di⁄erent types of visits. However, this group of markets also has the
higher number of patients per GP.
GP-level control variables
Because the data is anonymized, there is only limited information on the individual GP.
Next to the location in which she operates (zip code), we have information on her level of
accreditation (accr). This gives the percentage of time the GP chose to work under the
accreditation-system in that year; e.g. a GP that becomes accreditated only from July
onward will have a level of accreditation of 50%. The average level of accreditation is rather
high at 78%. This average can roughly be interpreted as the fraction of the GPs that
are accreditated. Upon closer investigation of this GP-level variable (Table 2) we ￿nd an
important link with the GP density in a market. That is, whereas in areas with a low GP
density on average 86% of the GPs is accreditated, the accreditated GPs only account for
66% of the GPs in GP dense areas. To the extent that this relation is not due to the di⁄erence
between Belgian Communities, this ￿nding is counterintuitive since we would expect that
the higher competition in the GP dense areas would urge GPs to get a higher price for every
visit they complete.
Furthermore, we are able to identify GPs￿medium run decision to operate in a local
market. We create dummy variables entry and exit that indicate for every GP whether
she respectively recently entered or is about to exit the market21. We identify in total 674
entrants (just before or in 2000 and in 2001) and 1;109 exiters (in 2002, 2003, 2004 or just
after) in the data set for 2001. This accounts for respectively 6% and 9% of the dataset.
Furthermore, most of the entrants and the exiters operate in markets with the highest GP
density. Therefore, the markets of group 5 do not only have the highest number of GPs per
capita, but also the highest turnover of GPs.
Although we have no information on GP speci￿cs such as gender and age, we can try to
pick up some of it by looking at the GP￿ s choice in composition of her visits. The percentage
home visits both during (perc_H_D) and outside working hours (perc_H_O) are variables
re￿ ecting the underlying preferences and possibly characteristics of the individual GP. For
21If the date of entry or exit takes place during the period of 2000 until 2004, the identi￿cation of entrants
and exiters is straightforward; we identify 1;293 such entrants and exiters. Entry and exit that falls just
outside our time window is chosen to be identi￿ed by GPs with less than 500 visits in the ￿rst or the last
year, accompanied with respectively increases and drops in the number of visits by half. In doing so, we
identify another 764 GPs.
9example, one expects that the percentage of home visits outside working hours is positively
correlated with being male and negatively with age and seniority22. In 2001, a GP executed
on average 37% of her visits at the patient￿ s home. Only a small percentage of all visits is
realized outside the working hours of the GP; that is, on average, night visits and visits in
the weekend or on holidays only account for 3% of all visits. The split up of GPs by the GP
densities in their market indicates that GPs in GP dense areas complete a slightly higher
percentage of their visits outside their o¢ ce (38% versus 35% for home visits during working
hours and 4% versus 2% for visits outside working hours). This can be for example due to
the characteristics of the GPs over the di⁄erent markets (e.g. more male GPs in GP dense
markets), due to the preferences of consumers in the di⁄erent markets (e.g. more elderly
in GP dense markets) or due to inducing behavior (e.g. induce in home visits because of
competitive pressure).
Market-level control variables
As Grytten et al. (1995) indicates, the health status is an important predictor of the
number of visits. Omitting variables capturing the health status would lead to biased results.
Since the zip code in which each GP operates is known, we add information on demographic
characteristics of each market in 2001. We use following indicators of the composition of
the population in local market: the age structure of the inhabitants (kids, young, adults
and old), the gender (female) and nationality composition (foreign). Furthermore, we add
the region of the local market (Flanders, Brussels), the mean income level (meaninc) and
the unemployment rate (unempl)23. These variables will be used as control variables in the
estimation of the level of demand for GP services as they proxy the average health status and
the health habits of the population. We ￿nally also add data on the location and the capacity
of both hospitals (hospbeds) and rest and nursing houses (restbeds), since the presence of such
institutions will have its impact on the workload of a GP, irrespective of her behavior.
The 2001 summary statistics of these variables are presented in Table 324.
22According to Dercq et al (2001), women have on average a percentage home visits of 35%, whereas male
GPs complete on average 45% of their contacts at the patient￿ s home. Starting GPs use the home visits
outside working hours as a way to get in contact with potential patients.
23In WIV (2001) the link between the demographic variables and the health status are investigated. It
shows for example that subjective health is decreasing in age and increasing in the education level. The
subjective health is also better in Flanders compared to the other regions of Belgium. As another example,
females are more susceptical to chronicle deceases and men smoke more.
24Only four of our explanatory variables show a clear correlation with the di⁄erent groups of markets (GP
density). As discussed before, it are the markets with the (slightly above) average GP density that have the
highest population size. We ￿nd the same pattern in the number of hospital beds: the highest number of
beds is found in cities, which belong to group 3 and group 4. For the age distribution of the markets, we
￿nd little di⁄erences across the groups: There only is a slightly higher percentage of elderly people and less
adults in the higher density markets.. And ￿nally, as indicated before, the percentage of markets in Flanders
103 Identifying GP induced demand
As in most of the empirical research, we investigate the presence of marginal SID through
identifying changes in the consumption due to changes in the supply. Since we are working
with GP-level data, the yearly number of visits per GP is used as the measure of consumption
while the supply is measured by GP density in the zip code (see e.g. Carlsen & Grytten,
1998, Giu⁄rida & Gravelle, 2001 and Słrensen & Grytten, 2001).
Because of the incentives to increase the demand for her services as the GP￿ s income
becomes pressured, inducement is characterized by the ￿nding of a positive correlation be-
tween per capita consumption and supply. Consider equation (1), in which the number of
visits of GP i which operates in local market j is denoted by Qij and in which Rj represents
the GP density in that local market.
ln(Qij) = ￿1 + ￿1 ln(Rj) + controlsij + "ij (1)
Coe¢ cient ￿1 then captures the percentage change in per GP consumption due to a
percentage increase in GP density. An easy transformation of the model shows that the
e⁄ect of a percentage increase in GP density results in an increase of (￿1 + 1) percent in
per capita consumption25. As a result, the absence of an e⁄ect on per capita consumption
requires that the estimated coe¢ cient of ￿1 is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent than ￿1. Intuitively,
if per capita consumption is not increasing with an additional entrant, GPs will now have to
share the total workload among one more GP. Thus, the necessary condition for the presence
of supplier inducement in a health care system is that ￿1 is estimated signi￿cantly larger
than ￿1. Furthermore, the absence of an e⁄ect on GP workload (￿1 = 0) implies that
per capita consumption is increasing proportionally with GP density. Intuitively, if every
GP maintains her workload, but now an extra GP is active, total consumption must have
increased.
However, this positive correlation can be ascribed to and explained by some other e⁄ects
(Reinhardt, 1985). First of all, we can be picking up a rationing e⁄ect. That is, it is possible
that the increase in consumption re￿ ects a previous excess demand for medical care which
is met. A second alternative explanation is that the e⁄ect stems from the mere fact that
GPs choose to locate their o¢ ce in markets with a higher demand (reverse causation). We
is very low in the high density groups (13% in group 5). The other characteristics of the markets are more
or less the same over the markets of the di⁄erent GP density groups.
25Given equation 1 and with QTOTj the total consumption in the area, the e⁄ect of GP density on the
per capita consumption is given by: ln
￿
QTOTj
DOCj
DOCj
MPOPj
￿
= ln
￿
QTOTj
MPOPj
￿
= ￿1 + (￿1 + 1)ln(Rj)
11thus need to treat the supply variable as an endogenous variable (Stano, 1985). Finally,
an availability e⁄ect can be the cause of the positive correlation between consumption and
supply. Even when prices are ￿xed, an increase in availability decreases the ￿ shadow price￿
of medical care, which in turn increases the consumption level (Birch, 1988)26. It is thus due
to the preferences of consumers that there is an increase in consumption as a result of an
increased supply. It is especially the presence of the availability e⁄ect that has proven to be
hard to control for (Escarse, 1992).
In the next subsection, we introduce the approach we chose to separately identify induce-
ment and availability e⁄ects. We start by presenting a theoretical model, based on Carlsen
& Grytten (1998). We chose to focus on the economic intuition underlying the model. For
this purpose, we remain brief on the analytical background and make some simpli￿cations
in terms of notation. We refer to Grytten et al. (1995) and Carlsen & Grytten (1998) for
the algebra. Second, we discuss the empirical implementation of the model and present the
equations to be estimated for the Belgium primary care market. A ￿nal subsection elaborates
on the e⁄ects of supply changes on the di⁄erent type of visits.
3.1 E⁄ect according to GP densities
Theoretical framework
The health literature has developed a considerable amount of theoretical models and sev-
eral empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the presence of supplier-inducement.
To correct for the availability e⁄ect, Birch (1988) and others use the distinction between the
e⁄ect on the number of visits and on the content of visits, whereas Rossiter & Wilensky
(1984) and subsequent authors use the distinction between patient- and GP-initiated visits.
Due to the nature of our data, these type of analyses can not be applied27. We instead
employ the methodology proposed by Carlsen & Grytten (1998), to separately identify the
inducement e⁄ect from the availability e⁄ect. Starting from a positive e⁄ect of increased
GP density on per capita consumption, towns are grouped according to their GP density.
The theoretical model shows that availability will especially be an issue in GP scarce areas,
whereas inducing demand is especially present in GP dense areas. Carlsen & Grytten (1998)
apply this technique to a sample of Norwegian contract physicians, for which no evidence of
26That is, the cost of care for the consumer does not only consist of the price to pay, but also of the time
and transportation costs associated with a visit to a GP (cost of access to health care). When an additional
GP enters the market, the average distance to a GP and the waiting time decrease.
27There is no data on the number of treatment items or on the content of a visit, nor on who initiated
what number of visits. Furthermore, the approach of Birch (1988) would in general not apply to Belgium,
since GP￿ s are not remunerated based on the number of laboratory tests.
12inducing behavior is found.
Assume that the utility of a GP in a market, U, is given by:
U = U(Y (Q);W(Q);C(￿;R)) (2)
Her utility is a positive function of the GP￿ s income level Y , which consists of a constant
part Y 0 and a variable part pQ, with p the fee per visit (UY > 0). Utility is furthermore
negatively a⁄ected by the workload, denoted by W (UW < 0), and the costs of inducing
demand, C (UC < 0). The latter is de￿ned as the costs associated to the deviation ￿ from
an assumed optimal number of visits, Q￿28. Bacause prices are ￿xed, the GP maximizes her
utility by choosing Q29. In deciding whether or not to induce demand for her services, the
GP will thus weigh the marginal bene￿ts (increase in income) against the marginal costs
(workload and other costs) of inducing an extra visit30:
UY:p 7 UW:WQ + UC:CQ (3)
In terms of economic theory, the micro-model builds on the assumption that GP utility
is concave in her income (UY Y < 0) and in her workload (UWW < 0). The former implies
that a decrease of income, due to e.g. an increase in competition, has a stronger e⁄ect on the
level of utility when income is already relatively low. Remark here that, in a fee-for-service
system, the GP￿ s income level is directly related to the number of visits. The latter implies
that the extra workload associated to more visits, will only decrease utility to a small extent
when the number of visits is rather low. Disregarding for now the other costs of inducing
demand, the model implies for GP dense areas that the bene￿ts of increasing the number
of visits will become greater than the disutility of the increased workload (all other things
equal). In these markets, supplier inducement will cause a positive association between
the GP density and per capita utilization. However, in GP scarce areas, a decrease in the
number of patients will not result in a reaction of inducement. Since the average level of
income and the number of visits per GP is high, the marginal bene￿ts of inducing demand
do not outweigh the marginal cost of it (all other things equal). Therefore, in these markets,
under the inducement hypothesis, no relation is expected between per capita utilization and
supply.
28In other words, ￿ is given by Q￿Q￿ (in Carlsen & Grytten (1998) this would be M ￿M￿). We simplify
the discussion by focussing on inducement, but in principle the utility function is discontinuous, because the
GP incurs costs from both an underprovision and inducement.
29In principle, we should write that she maximizes by choosing the number of recall visits instead of the
total number of visits. As indicated before, we simplify to give the main intuition of the model.
30We follow McGuire and Pauly (1991) and subsequent work on SID in assuming separable utility.
13Given the elevated levels of GP density in the Belgian primary care market, we intro-
duce an additional element to the model to capture a limitation to inducement due to the
information in the market31. The costs of inducing demand, C, do not not consist of the
e⁄ort and the moral costs (cfr. ￿ internal conscience￿by McGuire and Pauly (1991)), but
also the probability of loosing a patient has to be considered (Dranove, 1988). We therefore
explicitly model the costs of inducing demand as follows:
C = M(￿) + L(￿;R): (4)
The ￿rst component, M, is the traditional cost of inducing demand stemming from the
moral and e⁄ort costs. This part is increasing and convex in the degree of deviation from the
GP￿ s optimal number of visits (M￿ > 0; M￿￿ > 0)32. The second part, L, consists of the
costs of loosing a patient due to inducement. The more the GP deviates from her optimal
number of visits, the higher the probability of detection and thus the higher the probability
of loosing a patient (L￿ > 0)33. Furthermore, the probability of loosing a patient through
inducement increases with the GP density in that market. More precisely, it is assumed that
L is upward sloping in R (LR > 0) and that the cost increase due to inducing one visit more
is increasing in GP density (L￿R > 0). The reasoning goes as follows. Due to the asymmetric
information in the market, health services can be categorized as search and experience goods
(Gaynor, 1994). Experience and external information are the only means to diminish the
asymmetry. With a very high GP density, not only are there greater opportunities to get the
care elsewhere, also the amount of information in the market will be high. A patient will,
as a result, be able to detect inducing behavior more easily. As the number of competitors
increases, the GP￿ s cost of potentially loosing a patient due to inducing an extra visit will
start to outweigh the bene￿ts of inducing demand. Therefore, as the competition between
the GPs becomes ￿erce (high GP density), the GP will have incentives to act more as a
perfect agent, which results in a decrease of the incidence of supplier inducement34.
31Note that we are not talking about the constraint in the incentives of an individual GP by professional
norms. Instead, we are claiming there is a limitation to induce demand for all GPs operating in areas with
a very high GP density.
32The moral costs of inducing demand are individual speci￿c. Depending on the norms of the individual
GP, the decision of inducement is made. This explains why some GPs do and other do not induce demand.
33Surveys indicate that the familiariaty with the GP is an important aspect to the choice of the GP. Taken
together with the information asymmetry, the GP faces a very low probability of loosing a patient when
inducing only a small amount of demand. Only when the inducement behavior of the GP crosses a certain
threshold, she will start loosing patients. Therefore, it is expected as well that L￿￿ > 0.
34Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) argue that, when the market becomes more concentrated, patients know
less about one individual GP, which gives the latter market power and thus the opportunity to increase
prices. Remark ￿rstly that in our setting prices are ￿xed. Secondly, while it is true that you know less about
one single GP, you have greater access to comparing your GP with the behavior of another GP, which is the
14Finally, we assume that the preferences of consumers for distance and waiting are down-
ward sloping and concave. If the distance and waiting time are large/high, then the marginal
utility gain from drops in time and distance is higher compared to lower values of distance
and time. Improved availability is thus more likely to have a strong e⁄ect on per capita
utilization in areas in which the supply is scarce compared to GP dense areas.
In conclusion, the micro-model results in the following predictions with respect to induc-
ing behavior of the GP:
1. In GP scarce areas, the individual GP will have no incentives to induce demand because
the marginal bene￿ts do not outweigh the costs of inducing. However, availability
e⁄ects can play a role in these markets as the average distance/waiting time to a GP
is relatively high.
2. As the local market becomes more GP dense, the utility that can be gained from
inducing increases, until it outweighs the costs. The GP will thus resort to demand
inducement to maintain her income/utility level.
3. However, when the GP density is very high, the degree of information in the market,
and the resulting probability of loosing a patient, will keep the GP from inducing
demand.
Empirical implementation
In terms of empirical testing, we follow Grytten et al. (1995) and divide the local markets
into ￿ve equal-sized groups, according to GP density. That is, group 1 contains the 20%
zip codes with the lowest GP density, while group 5 collects the markets with the 20%
highest GP density. We work with ￿ve groups instead of with three (Carlsen & Grytten,
1998), because we want to allow for a richer range of e⁄ects. First of all, we expect the
middle groups to contain valuable information. Because of the generally high GP density
in Belgium, we expect that availability e⁄ects might quickly disappear and inducement can
be something GPs resort to quite fast (e.g. already in group 3-markets). Secondly, the data
shows that for the 20% markets with the highest GP density, there are on average 20:25 GPs
per 10;000 inhabitants. We therefore want to allow for a limitation in the inducing behavior.
With i referring to the individual GP, j to her local market and DRxj to dummy variables
indicating the group to which the local market is assigned (x 2 [1;5]), the equation to be
relevant issue here.
15estimated is given by:
ln(Qij) = ￿1 + ￿2DR2j + ￿3DR3j + ￿4DR4j + ￿5DR5j (5)
+￿1 ln(Rj) ￿ DR1j + ￿2 ln(Rj) ￿ DR2j + ￿3 ln(Rj) ￿ DR3j
+￿4 ln(Rj) ￿ DR4j + ￿5 ln(Rj) ￿ DR5j + controlsij + "ij
We thus split up the e⁄ect of GP density on the number of visits over ￿ve groups, with ￿k
the e⁄ect of GP density in local markets of group k. It is this splitting up that allows us to
separately identify inducement e⁄ects from availability e⁄ects. Note that this speci￿cation
only di⁄ers slightly from Carlsen & Grytten (1998): there are more groups and GP density
is interacted with every group to facilitates interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients35.
The availability hypothesis expects a positive e⁄ect of GP density on per capita consump-
tion only in GP scarce areas. Therefore, we would ￿nd a ￿1-coe¢ cient that is signi￿cantly
larger than ￿1 and possibly close to zero, as this implies a proportional increase with GP
density. Possibly these e⁄ects remain present in the group 2-markets and to a small extent
in the group 3 markets. In the latter markets, the e⁄ect of availability should however be less
than in the group 1-markets. We thus expect to ￿nd that, in the presence of only availability
e⁄ects, ￿2 and possibly ￿3 are still signi￿cantly larger than ￿1, but more negative compared
to ￿1. For the markets with a higher GP density, there should be no more e⁄ect. In other
words, we expect to ￿nd estimated coe¢ cients that make ￿4 and ￿5 not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from ￿1.
What if, on the other hand, only inducing behavior of GPs drives the e⁄ect of GP density
on per capita consumption? Since it is expected that inducing behavior will be optimal only
given a certain level of GP density (average income), we expect to ￿nd coe¢ cients that are
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1 for GP scarce areas. In more GP dense areas on the
other hand, the estimated coe¢ cients will be such that a higher GP density implies a higher
per capita consumption (or a lower drop in per GP workload). However, from which level
of GP density onward will it become optimal for a GP to induce demand as a response to
intensi￿ed competition? Given the generally high levels of GP density in Belgium, we expect
this to occur rather soon, perhaps already in the group 2-markets. On the other hand, as GP
density becomes very high (group 5), inducing demand might no longer be optimal because
of the empowered patients.
35In Carlsen & Grytten (1998), group 1 is used as the base group, which implies that the e⁄ect of GP
density for markets of group 2 is given by (￿1 + ￿2) instead of by ￿2 as in our speci￿cation.
16We can summarize the implications of the two hypothesis as follows:
group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5
H0: availability ￿1 = 0 0 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿1 0 > ￿3 ￿ ￿1 ￿4 = ￿1 ￿5 = ￿1
H0: inducement ￿1 = ￿1 0 > ￿2 ￿ ￿1 0 ￿ ￿3 > ￿1 ￿4 = 0 0 ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿1
Finally, both e⁄ects can be present simultaneously in the Belgian primary care market.
This would result in the ￿nding of signi￿cant e⁄ects on per capita consumption for almost
all groups, depending on how long availability e⁄ects last and how soon GPs start inducing
demand. We defer further elaboration to the results, because of the many possible combi-
nations. Finally, note again that the positive relation between per capita consumption and
GP density can not be attributed to price changes (neoclassic argument) as prices are ￿xed
and ￿xed independently of the GP density.
3.2 Type of visits
If we ￿nd evidence of SID, we are interested in knowing which type of visits is preferably used
by GPs to induce demand for their services. From the disutility of discretion model (Evans,
1974 and Rossiter & Wilensky, 1984) we learn that a GP is most likely to induce demand
for those visits that have the best trade-o⁄ between marginal bene￿t and marginal cost. In
terms of the theoretical model, expression (3) indicates that the likelihood of inducing is
higher the higher the fees, the lower the workload intensity (W Q) and the lower the costs of
inducement (CQ).
We distinguish between two types of visits, o¢ ce visits (Q_O¢ ce) and home visits during
working hours (Q_Home)36. For the inducement hypothesis, we can compare the di⁄erent
components of marginal costs and bene￿ts for o¢ ce and home visits.
￿ Fees: The payment a GP receives for an o¢ ce visit is relatively low; in 2001 the
GP￿ s fee was ￿xed at 15:53e for an accreditated GP and 14:75e for other GPs. The
price of home visits is substantially higher: for the same year, a home visit during
working hours was paid on average 19:9e, independent of being accreditated. Since
the marginal bene￿ts of inducement are thus higher for home visits, we expect that a
36We do not consider home visits outside working hours, because they do not take place in the same time
frame. Furthermore, they only represent a small part of the total visits. Finally, as Giu⁄rida & Gravelle
(2001) indicates, most GPs regard out-of-hours work as a negative aspect of their medical career (a source
of stress). Even though the fee for a night visits is often rather high compared to other visits (on average
32:49e in 2001), for the majority of the GPs the marginal cost of it will be very high as well.
17GP will rather be inclined to induce demand on home visits than on o¢ ce visits, and
that this will even be more the case for GPs that are not accredited.
￿ Workload intensity: O¢ ce visits have a relatively low e⁄ort cost, since the patient
incurs the transportation and waiting costs. On the contrary, by de￿nition, the GP
incurs the transportation and time costs in case of a home visit. Under the assumption
that the di¢ culty of an average home and o¢ ce visits are equal37, the e⁄ort costs of
the average home visits are higher compared to an o¢ ce visit. Note however that the
cost is mainly time costs, and since the opportunity costs of time are low when the
GP has no patients waiting, the expected time cost of inducing a home visit are rather
low. Nevertheless, this utlity component suggest a (small) preference of GPs to induce
o¢ ce visits over home visits.
￿ Other Costs: It is hard to maintain that the moral costs of inducing demand are larger
for one type of visit over the other. On the other hand, we can argue a di⁄erence in
e⁄ort costs (e⁄ort of inducing) and in the probability of loosing a patient. First, when a
GP has no work, it might ask less e⁄ort to get an additional home visit compared to an
o¢ ce visit. One of the reasons for this is the fact that patients bear no transportation
costs and the opportunity cost of waiting is low when a home visit is requested. The
total costs for the patient is therefore expected to be lower in case of a home visit38.
This does not only reduce the e⁄ort it takes to induce a visit, also the probability of
loosing a patient through inducement is smaller for home visits. So we expect that
the decision to induce demand will be taken ￿ quicker￿for home visits. However, since
GPs resort more quickly to home visits inducement, the e⁄ect of information in the
market on the detection probability is larger39. We therefore also expect that the costs
associated to the loss of a patient are more sensitive to the GP density for home visits.
Finally, remember that the availability e⁄ect implies an increasing per capita consumption
because of the preferences of the consumers. An additional GP in the market decreases time
37Some argue that a home visit is more di¢ cult becuase the GP has less material at hand to examine and
treat the patient. Also, it might be that home visits imply more severe sickness - although this is probably
thue for a certain percentage of home visits, it is hard to generalize this. However, when one is considering
inducing behavior, these arguments are no longer valid.
38A part of the home visits occur because the patient does not feel up to getting up and displacing himself.
His opportunity costs of having a GP visit are therefore very low. Also, there can be practical reasons
for requesting a home visit - the opportunity costs of going to the GP￿ s o¢ ce are in this case very high.
Therefore, even though the monetary costs of a home visit is 4e more, we expect total costs to be lower for
a home visit.
39This is related with the view of treatment as a sequence of actions and learning process (see McGuire,
2000). Since there will be more contacts, there will be more learning and thus a higher probability of
detection.
18and transportation costs to have access to the primary care, which results in an increase
of the demand. Now, since for home visits the GP incurs the transportation costs, the
availability e⁄ect will be considerably lower for these visits compared to for o¢ ce visits.
And because the opportunity costs of waiting for the GP are generally low for a home visit,
we expect availability e⁄ects to be virtually non-existing for these type of visits.
To test which type of visits GPs use for inducement, we thus estimate the following
equation:
ln(Q_typeij) = ￿1 + ￿2DR2j + ￿3DR3j + ￿4DR4j + ￿5DR5j (6)
+￿1 ln(Rj) ￿ DR1j + ￿2 ln(Rj) ￿ DR2j + ￿3 ln(Rj) ￿ DR3j
+￿4 ln(Rj) ￿ DR4j + ￿5 ln(Rj) ￿ DR5j + controlsij + "ij
with Q_typeij either the total number of o¢ ce visits of GP i in market j (Q_O¢ ceij)
or the total number of home visits during working hours (Q_Homeij). The interpretation
of the coe¢ cients remains the same as above.
4 Empirical results
We now take the above speci￿ed models to the data to answer these questions: Do we ￿nd
empirical evidence of supplier induced demand in the Belgian primary care market? And if
so, which type of visits does the GP use for inducing demand for her services?
Figure II: Number of visits per GP according to GP density of market
(nobs = 12,076 GPs)*
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* We excluded the 10 zip codes with the highest GP density (more than 31 GPs per inhabitants), to
show that the trend is not driven by the outliers. Including these local markets amplifies the effect.
Figure II shows that the number of visits of the average GP is decreasing in GP density.
This is the case because more GPs per capita implies that the number of patients per GP is
19lower, so that the pool of patients from which the GP can draw is smaller. But secondly, note
that this trend is convex: the higher the GP density, the smaller the e⁄ect of an increase
in GP density on the number of visits per GP. This is a ￿rst indication of the presence
of inducement and/or availability e⁄ects. The econometrical model is needed to identify
whether this trend is signi￿cant and which type of markets drive the convexity. That is,
if the convexity is driven by the markets with a low GP density, the convexity is proof
of availability e⁄ects, whereas GP dense markets causing convexity of the relation implies
evidence of inducing behavior of the GPs. Some further results of an initial investigation for
intuition on availability e⁄ects and supplier inducement are summarized in Appendix 2.
This section is structured as follows. We start by addressing some issues concerning the
implementation of the empirical model. Then we are ready for the estimation of the model.
First, we look at the results on the relation between per capita number of visits and the GP
density, by estimating the overall e⁄ect of GP density on GP consumption (equation (1)).
Second, in an attempt to distinguish between availability and inducement e⁄ects, the zip
codes are divided into ￿ve groups according to GP density and equation (5) is estimated.
We thus look for evidence of supplier-induced demand in GP visits. We also brie￿ y discuss
the e⁄ect of the control variables on the number of visits per GP. Finally, as we established
the results on the total consumption, we pay special attention to the availability e⁄ects and
inducing behavior for the di⁄erent types of visits (equation (6))..
4.1 Identi￿cation
We discuss three aspects of the identi￿cation of the model; the endogeneity of the supply
variable, the control for GP-speci￿c characteristics and border-crossing.
First, we need to correct for GPs locating in the most attractive locations (reverse causa-
tion). To get consistent results in the cross-section analysis, GP density is treated as being
endogenous and thus instrumented through a two-stage-least-squares estimation. Dranove &
Wehner (1994) demonstrate how the use of invalid instruments in a market-level cross-section
analysis can lead to false conclusions, by showing that an inducement e⁄ect can be found
in the market for childbirths. Furthermore, a validity test for the instruments is proposed:
the instruments are only valid if the correlations between the residuals of the OLS-estimates
and the instruments are low and insigni￿cant, implying that they would be excluded from
the demand equation.
Finding valid instruments is easier in case of micro-level data40. In line with Carlsen
40We are estimating the demand for a single GP. In this respect, we escape the identi￿cation critique by
Auster & Oaxaca (1981) where it is shown that the e⁄ect of market supply on market demand can not be
20& Grytten (1998), we use variables based on the number of inhabitants as instruments for
GP density. It is thus assumed that population measures only a⁄ect the demand for GP
services through GP density, which hinges on the assumption that per capita consumption
does not depend on the number of inhabitants in the market. Furthermore, the number of
inhabitants measures the market size and market opportunities, what implies a correlation
with the number of entrants in the market and thus the density of health providers41. We
use four instruments: the number of inhabitants in the relevant market (mpop) and the
logarithm of the population (lnmpop), population density in the local market (dens) de￿ned
as the number of inhabitants per squared kilometre and ￿nally, the number of inhabitants
in markets within a range of 5 km (npop5). We use a transformation of population to
allow for a ￿ exible relation between population and GP density42. For population density,
again, there is no reason why a patient would demand more visits per GP when there is a
higher/lower population density, other than the extent to which this a⁄ects GP density. The
nearby population measure is added to control for potential demand in the area. Note that
for the model in which the endogenous variable is interacted with dummies, the instruments
are interacted as well43.
For all analyses below, correlation matrices indicate that the instruments are valid. Also
the ￿rst stage estimation results indicates statistical signi￿cant partial correlations of all
the instruments. Finally, an heteroskedasticity-robust validity test on the overidentifying
restrictions is not rejected.
Second, it is important to correct for GP-speci￿c characteristics in the estimation pro-
cedure to prevent bias. Suppose e.g. that markets with a high GP density also typically
attract a higher percentage of male GPs. As male GPs more often work fulltime and thus
have more visits, omitting GP-speci￿c characteristics leads to falsely concluding in favor of
demand inducement in GP dense areas. As GPs are anonymized in our data, the GP-speci￿c
variables are however connected to the behavior of the GP; the degree of accreditation (accr),
the decision to enter or exit the market (entry, exit) and the percentage visits of di⁄erent
types (perc_H_D, perc_H_O). First of all, it is clear that a new entrants will have a lower
identi￿ed.
41Think for example of theoretical models of competition (f.e. Cournot competition), which predict more
￿rms to enter when the market size is bigger. Furthermore theory predicts that the more ￿rms there are
already present in the market, the smaller the increase in market size needs to be to sustain another entrant
(Sutton 1991). So the GP density increases with market size.
42The results from the inclusion of other transformations, such as population squared, are the same. The
conclusions in terms of inducing behavior in the Belgian primary care market are also checked to be robust
against exclusion of some of the instruments.
43This implies that we treat the group dummies as being exogenous. Previous work (Carlsen & Grytten,
1998) made the same assumption.
21number of visits, as she is still in the process of building up a clientele. Also those GPs
that decided to exit the market in one of the following years, will decrease the services they
provide and perform less visits. Second, whereas our variables do pick up the underlying
characteristics of the GP, they are however endogenous. We opt for the inclusion of the GP-
speci￿c characteristics as explanatory variables and accept the possible bias. Robustness of
our conclusions is checked by looking at a cross-section that omits the GP speci￿c variables.
The main conclusions remain valid44.
Third and ￿nally, the possibility of border-crossing needs to be taken into account. As
indicated in the data section, we de￿ne the relevant market as the zip code area. However, it
might be that consumers cross the border of the zip code area to e.g. a market with a higher
supply. To correct for this feature, we also ran the analyses when the relevant market is the
municipality and when GP density is thus de￿ned accordingly45. We moreover experimented
with the exclusion of big cities from our data in order to limit border-crossing e⁄ects. Again,
the results on inducement are not sensitive to both experiments, which makes us con￿dent
in the robustness of the conclusions.
4.2 SID in the Belgian primary care market
We start by estimating the model that explains the total number of visits in which we make
no distinction according to GP density, as presented in equation (1). The ￿rst two columns
of Table 4 presents the results of this estimation. The OLS-estimation indicates a signi￿cant
negative e⁄ect of GP density on the number of visits. More precisely, the results suggest that
a 1% increase in the GP density leads to a signi￿cant decrease in number of visits per GP
of 0:179%. With the estimated coe¢ cient negative, we can exclude demand rationing since
this would imply that individual GPs are not a⁄ected by an additional entrant. In terms of
per capita consumption, the results imply that a 1% increase in R leads to a 0:821% increase
in per capita consumption.
Once we correct for the endogenous nature of the supply, the estimated coe¢ cient is no
44An alternative is to turn to ￿xed-e⁄ect estimation and use the panel structure of our data set (2000-
2004). Although this approach would give unbiased results while allowing for GP-speci￿c e⁄ects, our dataset
does not allow the use of this technique: we have a problem with the instrumentation of GP density, as we
only have demographic information for 2001. Making some simplifying assumptions, the conditional results
of a static FE estimation seem to support our general conclusions. Note that we also check for robustness
of the results by considering the data for the other years, while assuming the demographics did not change
in this period. Agian, the main conclusions do not change. Also dif-in-dif estimation is hard since there is
both exit and entry in the markets at the same time.
45There are on average 1:95 zip codes in a municipality as de￿ned by NIS, ranging from 1 zip code to as
many as 20 zip codes.
22longer signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, whereas it remains di⁄erent from ￿1. We thus ￿nd
evidence of a more or less proportional increase in per capita consumption due to an increase
in GP density. Do patients react strongly to increased availability? Or rather, do GPs have
so much power over the demand that they can fully absorb an increase in competition? To
get a better insight, we move to the model that distinguishes between these possibilities.
The third column of Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (5), in which
the e⁄ect of GP density on per GP consumption is split up over ￿ve groups. For the
interpretation of these e⁄ects, we perform Wald-tests on the estimated coe¢ cients. The
outcomes of these tests are given in the ￿rst column of Table 5. Consider a 5% signi￿cance
level46. We ￿nd evidence of the presence of both availability and inducement e⁄ects. As ￿1
is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1, while not estimated signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, there
is a more or less proportional increase in per capita consumption of primary care with an
increase in GP density, for markets with a low GP density (among the 20% lowest). The
availability e⁄ect however dies out once the GP density increases: for market in group 2, we
cannot ￿nd evidence of changes in per capita or per GP consumption with GP density. We
also ￿nd little e⁄ects for the market with intermediate GP density (group 3 and group 4).
Finally, a proportional increase of utilization with GP density does occurs in the markets of
group 5: ￿5 is estimated signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1 while not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. Based on the theoretical model attributes, this positive correlation is attributed to
inducing behavior of the GPs in these GP dense areas. We thus conclude to ￿nd evidence of
availability e⁄ects in the markets with the lowest GP density and of inducement in markets
with the highest GP density.
Consider also the e⁄ects of the variables controlling for GP characteristics. The higher
the accreditation level (accr), the more visits a GP has on yearly basis. Since this possibly
proxies quality and since GPs with a high number of visits have a higher bene￿t of being
accreditated (higher price), this is as expected. The percentage home visits during the
working hours (perc_H_D) also has a positive e⁄ect on the number of visits. This is intuitive
as this variable can be interpreted as the willingness to comply with the preferences of the
patient as consumer. Furthermore, it captures characteristics such as being male or working
full time. Finally, this may already indicate that GPs who perform more home visits, also ￿nd
it easier to induce demand for their services. A high percentage of visits that is completed
outside working hours (perc_H_O) on the other hand, has a negative impact on the total
number of visits. This can indicate that small-sized GPs intent to gain patients from other
46The overall conclusion of the presence of inducing behavior would remain valid if we work with for
example the 10% signi￿cance level
23GPs by taking on a larger part of guard duty. And as expected, GPs that only recently
entered the market (enter) and are planning to exit the market (exit) both complete a lower
number of visits.
Remember that these variables are however endogenous, but that dropping them would
lead to an omitted variable bias. The conclusions from the estimation without these GP-
speci￿c variables are however comparable47.
Most of the market characteristics have the expected sign. There is signi￿cantly less
demand from children (kids) or from young people (young) (depending on the speci￿cation)
compared to adults, as the former are in general in a better condition and can use the
pediatrician as the primary care physician instead of the GP48. Remarkable, the percentage
elderly (old) also has a negative sign, which implies that the number of visits per GP is
lower in markets with a more elderly compared to more adults. This might be explained
by the fact that elderly perhaps resort to other types of care, such as retirement homes and
geriatric care, which results in a lower demand for GP services by this age group. The fact
that adults need a sick note to be excused from work, can also help explain these results. It
is thus the adults that provide the most workload for the GPs.
Possibly due to di⁄erent habits and culture, the percentage foreigners (foreign) has a
negative e⁄ect on the number of visits, as has the mean income level (meaninc). The latter
implies that the higher the income level in a town, the lower the workload of a GP is. This
can be due to several reasons. Whereas it is tempting to conclude that money prevents
illness, this e⁄ect is more likely due to the fact that people with a higher income more easily
substitute toward specialist care. It is also possible that we pick up an education e⁄ect
here and that we ￿nd that it is harder to induce demand for your services if your patients
are highly educated (Pauly, 1978). We ￿nd on the other hand that the unemployment rate
(unempl) and the region dummy for Flanders (Flanders) have a positive estimated e⁄ect on
the number of visits per GP. As the unemployed has in general a higher need for health care49
and as the GP density in Flanders is in general lower compared to the region of Wallonia,
this is as expected. Finally, we also ￿nd the number of hospital beds (hospbeds) to have a
negative in￿ uence on the workload of the GP. Since the proximity of many hospital beds
generally implies the presence of many specialists, this variable indicates the ease to refer a
patient to a specialist or the ease for patients to substitute toward specialist visits.
47The results of the Wald-tests are all the same, so we also ￿nd availability e⁄ects in the markets with the
lowest GP density and inducement in the markets with the highest GP density. The estimated coe¢ cients of
the market level variables do change, but only the signi￿cance of the unemployment rate is slightly a⁄ected
(only signi￿cant at a 10% signi￿cance level).
48There is no gatekeeping system in Belgium.
49Note also that often a person is unemployed because of health problems.
24Remark that the sign and signi￿cance of the market characteristics remain the same over
the estimation of the di⁄erent types.
4.3 Which types of visits are induced?
We concluded in the previous section that we ￿nd evidence of supplier-inducement in the
Belgian primary care market. Now we are interested in the type of visits GPs then typically
use for inducing their demand. Therefore, we estimate two models, one with the number
of o¢ ce visits as dependent variable and one explaining the number of home visits during
working hours (equation (6)). We do not report the estimated coe¢ cients of these estimations
(they are available from the author on request). Instead, the second and third column of
Table 5 report the relevant Wald-tests on the estimated coe¢ cients ￿k for both estimations.
Consider again a 5% signi￿cance level.
Looking at the o¢ ce visits, we ￿nd comparable results as for the total number of vis-
its. That is, we ￿nd evidence of both availability e⁄ects amongst markets with the 20%
smallest GP density and inducement e⁄ects in the markets with the highest GP density.
However, note that we now do ￿nd a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect of GP density on per capita
consumption in markets with a more moderate GP density as well (group 4 markets).
For home visits during working hours on the other hand, we ￿nd a very di⁄erent pat-
tern. First of all, as expected, there is no evidence of availability e⁄ects, since ￿1 is not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1. As the GP density increases, the e⁄ect of GP density on per
capita consumption becomes signi￿cantly positive. Remarkably, we already ￿nd evidence
of inducing behavior at the average GP densities (in group 3). Also, the inducing behavior
seems to be most present in markets with an average or slightly higher than average GP
density (group 3 and group 4 markets), as the estimated e⁄ect on per GP consumption is
estimated signi￿cantly positive50. Finally, in the markets with the 20% highest GP density,
the estimated e⁄ect is still signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿1 but not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. Therefore, while there still is evidence for inducement in the GP dense markets (group
5), this e⁄ect is signi￿canlty less than in the markets with a lower GP density. In other
words, whereas we ￿nd clear evidence of a strong positive relation between GP density and
the consumption of home visits for the markets with a lower GP density, the e⁄ect is more
moderate for the group 5 markets. The very high levels of GP density seem to limit the
possibility of inducing demand for home visits51.
50We suspect that GPs, next to maintaining utility/income levels, also feel the need to show their patients
that they are followed-up closely, as a signal of quality.
51Remark that we also estimate a constant term per group. Therefore the argument that GPs complete
25Comparing both types of visits, we ￿nd that GPs use both type of visits to induce demand.
However, GPs resort to inducing home visits more quickly (in the sense of less competitive
pressure) than to inducing o¢ ce visits. On the other hand, when the GP density is very
high, the information in the market limits the possibility of inducing home visits, resulting
in inducement of o¢ ce visits. We can thus conclude that GPs prefer the use of home
visits during working hours to induce demand for their services. But when competition gets
￿erce, they substitute towards inducement through o¢ ce visits because of the risk of loosing
patients that is associated with continuing inducement of home visits.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we look for empirical evidence of supplier induced demand in the Belgian
primary care market. Using GP-level data of all registered Belgian GPs (rather than a
sample), we test whether a higher GP density results in a higher per capita consumption
of GP services, due to the behavior of the GP. Furthermore, we investigate the way GPs
induce demand. That is, does a GP employ o¢ ce visits or rather home visits to increase the
demand for her services. Our empirical results indicate that Belgian GPs do induce demand
for their services and that they prefer to induce through home visits during working hours.
However, when competition becomes ￿erce, the opportunity to induce home visits reduces,
resulting in a substitution towards o¢ ce visits inducement52.
Evidence on SID by GPs in other countries has been mixed. Rossiter & Wilensky (1983)
for example ￿nds evidence of physician-initiated medical expenditures in the US, based on
market level data. Some evidence of SID is found in France by Delattre & Dormont (2003),
based on a panel data study of a sample of GPs. There also is some clear indication that
physicians in general do respond to ￿nancial incentives in the UK (Croxson et al., 2001).
On the other hand, in a series of papers on Norway, Grytten and co-authors ￿nd no
empirical evidence of inducing behavior of GPs who are operating in a system that is com-
parable to the Belgian health care system. However, whereas the institutional setting is more
or less the same, the level of GP density is much lower in Norway. Grytten et al. (1995)
documents that for the 20% Norwegian markets with the highest GP density, the average
more home visits in higher density markets because they have the time for it, whereas in low GP density
areas GPs do not have the time, is not explaining our results on inducing behavior. This argumentation
is moreover not valid in general as we ￿nd that the number of home visits is lower in markets of group 5
(signi￿cantly lower for group 3 and group 4) compared to group 1: a GP in a GP dense area completes more
home visits, holding everything else constant.
52The fact that over the 5 years that we observe, the total number of visits decrease only due to decrease
in the number of home visits supports this ￿nding.
26population per physician is 1;818. In Belgium on the other hand, the 20% most GP dense
markets have an average of only 496 inhabitants per GP. It might therefore be that the level
of competition for which the bene￿ts of inducing outweigh the costs of inducing is not yet
reached in Norway. Put di⁄erenly, if the GP density in Belgium would be decreased to the
Norwegian level, it is expected that the incentives for GPs to induce demand will disappear.
Since we have found evidence of SID in Belgium, there are important implications for
public health policy. To limit the extent to which GPs induce demand, regulating the
number of GPs in a local market can be a good idea. In this sense, our conclusions could be
an argument in favor of the existence of the numerus clausus of GPs in Flanders, limiting the
in￿ ow in the profession. We do however not take a stand on the magnitude of the number of
beginning GPs per year and on the way this numerus clausus is to be implemented, nor on the
other e⁄ects a numerus clausus has on the functioning of the primary care market. Secondly,
our results highlight the presence of positive consequences of the decrease in the number of
students that opt for a career as GP. Whereas the media talkes about a daunting shortfall
of GPs in Belgium, limiting the inducing behavior of the GPs is an expected positive e⁄ect
of this evolution. Signi￿cantly decreasing the number of GPs however has consequences for
the overall availability of primary care, which is something the regulator may not want to
abate.
276 Appendix
6.1 GP density across Belgium
Local markets with a higher than average GP density
Local markets with a lower than average GP density
286.2 Initial insights in dataset
Before moving to the formal investigation of the presence of supplier inducement in the
Belgian primary care market, we take a more detailed look at the data. There are several
indications in the data of a positive relation between consumption and supply.
Aggregating the data to the zip code level provides insights on the relation between
the total consumption in an area and the number of suppliers. First of all, the correlation
coe¢ cient between the number of visits per capita and the GP density over the years is
0:497. This positive correlation indicates that it is worthwhile to investigate the presence of
GP-inducement; is this positive correlation due to availability reasons, di⁄erences between
inhabitants or is there indeed some inducing behavior of GPs?
Secondly, there is some indication that the availability e⁄ect is important. When we
compute for each zip code the ratio of the number of patients to the number of inhabitants,
we ￿nd that this percentage has a positive correlation with the GP density (corr = 0:568).
Thus, the more GPs per inhabitant, the more patients visited one of the GPs at least once
that year. This thus indicates either that more people visits a GP because of their availability,
or that GPs choose to locate in these towns where there is a high demand for their services.
Since the GP has no control over the people that never visit a GP, the visits that stem
from new patients can not be induced. Rather, the increased availability of primary care
encourages the patients to visit the GP, since the costs decreased.
Going back to the GP level data, the average number of o¢ ce visits per patient of a GP
can give some indication of inducement. Since the costs of establishing the agency relation is
important, the marginal cost of inducing is generally smaller for the current clientele (Birch,
1988). Therefore, we believe that the ratio of the number of o¢ ce visits to the number of
patients contains good information on the inducing behavior of the GP, and that this is
related to the income level of the individual GP. We thus compute the number of o¢ ce visits
per patient per GP and ￿rst relate this to the number of patients per GP. We ￿nd that
there is a negative correlation between both variables: the higher the number of patients,
the lower the number of visits per patient. Secondly, relating the number of o¢ ce visits per
patient to the total GP income from her services, con￿rms our expectation. Whereas a GP
with an income of among the 20% highest on average has 3:90 o¢ ce visits per patient, a GP
in the lowest 20% income category sees each of her patients on average 5:05 times per year.
A low income GP thus has one o¢ ce visit more per patient per year compared to a high
income GP, which indicates inducing behavior of the low income GP.
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34Table 4: Estimation results of cross-section analysis on the total number of contacts per GP,
without and with distinction on the level of GP density (2001)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Coe⁄. (St. E.) Coe⁄. (St.E.) Coe⁄. (St.E.)
Effect of GP density
￿1 ￿0:179￿ (0:03) ￿0:048 (0:21) 0:135 (0:41)
￿2 - - ￿1:458 (1:28)
￿3 - - 4:569 (2:86)
￿4 - - 0:820 (1:09)
￿5 - - ￿0:011 (0:23)
Control variables GP characteristics
accr 0:484￿ (0:02) 0:489￿ (0:02) 0:485￿ (0:02)
perc_H_D 0:605￿ (0:04) 0:607￿ (0:04) 0:609￿ (0:04)
perc_H_O ￿1:984￿ (0:12) ￿1:985￿ (0:12) ￿2:004￿ (0:13)
entry ￿1:733￿ (0:03) ￿1:740￿ (0:04) ￿1:731￿ (0:03)
exit ￿1:068￿ (0:02) ￿1:072￿ (0:03) ￿1:068￿ (0:03)
Control variables market characteristics
kids ￿1:922￿ (0:68) ￿1:644￿ (0:81) ￿2:621￿ (0:78)
young ￿1:214 (0:66) ￿1:433 (0:75) ￿1:808￿ (0:72)
old ￿1:543￿ (0:48) ￿1:879￿ (0:72) ￿1:651￿ (0:51)
female 1:273 (0:94) 1:407 (0:96) 1:061 (1:02)
foreign ￿0:606￿ (0:14) ￿0:572￿ (0:15) ￿0:703￿ (0:16)
Flanders 0:264￿ (0:03) 0:310￿ (0:08) 0:249￿ (0:03)
Brussels ￿0:023 (0:05) ￿0:029 (0:05) ￿0:009 (0:05)
unempl 1:556￿ (0:41) 1:662￿ (0:44) 1:713￿ (0:48)
meaninc ￿0:139￿ (0:03) ￿0:156￿ (0:04) ￿0:138￿ (0:03)
hospbeds ￿0:000￿ (0:00) ￿0:000￿ (0:00) ￿0:089￿ (0:02)
restbeds ￿0:000 (0:00) 0:000 (0:00) 0:009 (0:02)
￿1 8:290￿ (0:46) 7:968￿ (0:69) 7:996￿ (0:92)
R2 0:46 0:46 0:45
Comumn (1) and (2) gives the results for the estimation of equation 1, with no distinction according to GP density.
Column (3) reports the estimated coe¢ cients for the estimation of equation 5, with towns divided into 5 equal
sized groups according to the GP density. ￿1 relates to the towns with a GP density amongst the 20% smallest
in Belgium, whereas ￿5 refers to the 20% markets with the highest GP density. IV estimation is performed using
mpop, npop5, dens and lnmpop as instruments for logaritm of GP density (R). Standard errors are reported
between brackets. ￿ indicates signi￿cance at a 5% level. The other constants (￿5) are estimated insigni￿cant
and therefore not reported.
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